As Assad falls, Turkish-backed attacks on Kurdish areas intensify. Journalist Khabat Abbas warns of ISIS resurgence and fears for Rojava's future.
Khabat, what was your first thought when it became clear on 8 December that the opposition took Damascus and Assad fled the country?
In many parts of Syria, people immediately started celebrating, feeling joy and relief. But for me, it was different—I was concerned. I found myself asking: What is the alternative? Who are these people emerging as the new power? And most importantly, what does this mean for minorities, like us Kurds?
The Kurdish community didn’t get a moment to celebrate Assad’s fall, even though we were among the most persecuted by his regime. At the very moment, we were still being shelled and attacked in our areas by Turkish-backed militias. So no, we didn’t get to experience a moment of joy and we didn’t get a space to grieve for all the suffering we’ve endured over those years. There was no time to process anything. Instead, we went straight into a state of self-defense, constantly thinking about what’s coming next.
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) increasingly attacked the Kurdish autonomous region. How has the situation in north-east Syria developed in recent days?
There has been an intensification of confrontations along the frontlines, particularly involving Turkish-backed militias such as the SNA. They announced an operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) [the official military wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, supported by the U.S., Anm. d. Red.]. It is called Fajr al-Hurriya [engl. Dawn of Liberation]. Their attacks have focused on areas such as Manbij, the Raqqa countryside, and the Western Euphrates–regions that were previously under the Russian-guaranteed agreements established in 2019. Despite these fierce attacks, the SDF has held its ground and prevented the SNA from seizing control of these areas.
In response, Turkey has significantly increased its involvement, deploying drones and warplanes. Nevertheless, the SNA has failed to take control of Manbij.
Now, the SDF troops withdrew from Manbij. That was part of the U.S. agreement, why?
The SDF fought fiercely for Manbij. The city is of great symbolic importance for the Kurdish People's Defence Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ). In 2016, during the fight against the Islamic State (IS), many YPG and YPJ fighters lost their lives or were seriously injured here.
But despite the resistance and sacrifices, the involvement of major powers such as the U.S. led to an agreement that transferred control of the city to Turkish-backed militias. To save civilian lives and prevent further bloodshed, the SDF decided to withdraw. This reflects a wider reality: outcomes in Syria are often determined by the deals made by foreign powers, rather than the will or sacrifices of those on the ground.
This agreement led by the U.S. includes a ceasefire between the SDF and SNA in certain areas. Does that give you hope?
Unfortunately, the track record of ceasefires over the past decade has been dismal, particularly those guaranteed by Russia. Even with U.S. backing, I don’t expect this ceasefire to be substantially different. It’s limited to specific areas, like Manbij, and doesn’t cover all of north-eastern Syria. Today [11.12.2014, Anm. d. Red.], for instance, there were drone attacks in Raqqa and Qamishli—clear violations of any ceasefire agreement. As the weaker party in this conflict, the SDF often adheres to such agreements, whereas Turkey frequently disregards them. Without enforcement mechanisms or consequences for breaches, these ceasefires are nothing more than temporary pauses in hostilities.
Erdogan has been launching attacks on the region for years and has consistently pushed for a 30-kilometer-deep strip of control on the Syrian side of the border. How do you assess Turkey's current ambitions?
As Turkey faces no meaningful opposition, Erdogan is likely to pursue his plans aggressively. A 30-kilometer buffer zone would include all the Kurdish cities along the border, such as Qamishli. This plan would effectively eradicate the Kurdish presence in these areas. Turkey has already occupied Afrin, Serê Kaniyê, and Girê Spî.
Without international intervention—whether from the U.S. or the EU—there is little to stop Turkey and the SNA. Their militias, many of whom have ties to former ISIS fighters, appear driven by revenge against the Kurds. Their aim is not only to liberate detained militants in camps and prisons, but also to seize control of resource-rich regions. These areas contain valuable oil, gas, water, and agricultural resources which Turkey and its allies seek to exploit.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has expressed intentions to support a country for all. What is the nature of the dialogue between the SDF and HTS?
There isn’t much information about these interactions but there are indications of some level of contact. During the recent HTS takeover of certain neighborhoods in Aleppo, an agreement was reportedly reached allowing the YPG and YPJ to maintain control in some areas. Additionally, the SDF has expressed a willingness to engage with whoever holds power in Damascus to secure a future for Syria.
There are several ISIS prisoners in north-east Syria. The Autonomous Administration of Northern Syria (AANES) has been warning for years that prison breaks like the one in Hasaka in 2022 could happen again due to the difficult security situation. Are groups like the SNA now planning to free these fighters?
Absolutely. Former ISIS fighters are now part of the SNA. This is evident in their rhetoric and communication, mainly on platforms such as Telegram. They argue, “Why are our prisoners under Kurdish control while others have been freed from Assad’s custody, like Sednaya?”. There are active ISIS cells in the region, some linked to Turkish-backed forces, that are actively planning attacks to liberate detainees.
This, combined with the broader chaos caused by Turkish strikes and other developments, makes the situation volatile. The danger of an ISIS jailbreak remains high, posing a major threat not only to Syria but also to its neighbor Iraq. Iraqi authorities have also expressed concern, warning they would intervene if the situation in al-Hol escalated.
How is the SDF reacting?
The risks are high, especially in al-Hol, a massive camp guarded by internal security forces who are already stretched thin, dealing with multiple frontlines and controlling cities like Raqqa. As a precaution, a curfew has been in effect in north-eastern Syrian cities from 8 PM to 8 AM for the past five days. However, with guards redeployed to more urgent priorities, the security of detention facilities has been compromised. Despite continuous warnings over the years, the international community has failed to address the issue, leaving this situation as a ticking time bomb.
At the moment, do you see any differences between SNA, ISIS, and other Islamist groups in Syria?
For many, these groups are seen as opposition fighters and an alternative to Assad. But for us, they are not. As a woman and someone fighting for democracy and human rights in Rojava, I cannot accept such groups as legitimate rulers of Syria. Over the past 15 years, we’ve built a system in north-eastern Syria that respects minorities and provides an alternative to both the Ba'athist regime and radical Islamist ideologies.
The leader of HTS, Abu Mohammad al-Dscholani, had close ties to ISIS and is a former member of the al-Nusra Front. He is rebranding HTS claiming to respect minorities like the Druze and Alawites but doesn’t even mention Kurds. In the last few days, various groups have been executing and humiliating Kurds. Of course, we cannot trust these people. Of course, there is no hope for Syria under their rule. ISIS flags have reappeared in places like Latakia and Damascus. Fighters from abroad are joining them. These are clear warning signs that the international community should not ignore.
What has to happen now?
The priority now is to remain vigilant, to fully understand the new government, and what’s coming next. There will be time to celebrate, but later. Right now, it’s urgent to establish a constitution and a committee that truly reflects the diversity of Syria.
