A series of diplomatic initiatives has shown that not only global, but also regional players seek to negotiate a settlement of the Syrian crisis. Yet, despite its political weight in the region, Turkey remains outside these processes. This is due not only because of the stance of the ruling party, but a number of domestic problems – with important regional implications. By Timur Akhmetov
The month of August witnessed important diplomats touring the region trying to find a solution to the Syrian civil war. In particular, Russia, a main supporter of the Syrian government, has intensified its efforts to bring together stakeholders.
In late July, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the council of ministers, Walid Muallem visited Moscow. Then, on August 4, Tehran hosted a meeting between Muallem and the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov, a special representative of the Russian President in the Middle East and African countries. Also in August, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov participated in a multilateral meeting in Doha. Together with colleagues from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States he sought to find a common position concerning the situation in Syria. Subsequently, on August 11, Adel al-Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, visited Moscow to demur the Kremlin’s support for the Syrian government. Finally, on August 13, representatives of the Syrian opposition, the National Coalition for the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, headed by Khaled al-Hodge, went to Moscow to discuss a possible way out of the current stalemate.
Bold support – with red lines
An examination of these meetings and diplomatic initiatives shows that many parties are prepared to engage in dialogue and exchange of views. Moscow made clear that its support for Assad is not absolute, while political change should be pursued in concert with all political forces. Another big surprise was the change in the foreign policy line of Saudi Arabia: Since January 2015, the new king Salman seeks to establish positive relationships with the states that support Assad. His minister of defense Mohammed bin Salman added that the parties should capitalize on similar interests. This desire for dialogue was furthermore demonstrated by two other major players, the US and Iran, who recently signed an important agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program.
Most parties agree on their assessment of the “Islamic State” as a terror-organization, which needs to be curtailed. They consider the organization a danger not only for the Middle East region as a whole but also for their own national security. Accordingly, they ponder accusations of alleged use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, recruiting and training foreign fighters, the destruction of cultural heritage, as well as systematic murder of opponents of the organization.
At the same time, the diplomatic meetings have revealed dissensions that threaten to further obstruct the possibility of a resolution of the ensuing drama in Syria. Primarily, there is disagreement on how exactly to combat the “Islamic state”.
Russia and Iran, for instance, insist on the creation of a broad “anti-terrorist front” comprising armies of Iraq and Syria, but also the Syrian opposition and international coalition forces. This is even more problematic since their credo is that the fight against the “Islamic state” should be preceded by a political resolution of the Syrian conflict. This resolution should include the creation of a transitional government and a referendum held on the fate of the current Syrian president.
The Gulf monarchies, however, as the main sponsors of the armed Syrian opposition, push for the immediate withdrawal of the Syrian president. They stress the need for political changes even at the sight of an acute threat from the seizure of further territories at the hands of the “Islamic state”. The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Al-Jubeir stated during his visit to Moscow that they hold Assad directly responsible for the emergence of the terrorist group. Thus, in the eyes of the Syrian opposition and their supporters, Assad is an integral part of the current crisis – not of its solution.
All but one?
Amidst the escalation of diplomatic initiatives, what gives that Turkey, a regional powerhouse, remains out of the current negotiating process? Primarily, this hinges on the policy of the leading Justice and Development Party (AKP), which warrants further consideration.
First, contrary to the countries participating in the negotiations, Turkey does not seem to yield any influence on the main political forces in the Syrian crisis. This is especially important when considering the role of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in sponsoring moderate Islamists. Against that, Turkey only offers logistical assistance. The joint Turkish-US initiatives for the creation and training of combat units for the moderate opposition are comparatively dismal. Also, existing groups have shown low efficiency; not only in fighting with government troops but also with the Islamist forces.
Second, as the analysis of the latest developments reveals, Turkey still does not see the “Islamic state” as the primary threat to its national security. Although Ankara can no longer ignore the terrorist organization’s activity on its own territory, it has not yet started to actively combat it. Despite the loud statements made domestically and in the international arena after the terrorist attack committed on July 20 in the border town of Suruç, the Turkish government still prefers directing all available resources into the fight with the Kurdish separatists and the Syrian government. This indicates the uncompromising stance of Ankara in the Syrian crisis.
Third, Turkey can’t resolve the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist organization. Even though the ruling AKP promised a final resolution at the height of its political success more than ten years ago, clashes between the PKK and security officials continue to this day. The manipulation of the conflict and the use of propaganda for political purposes by the ruling party are of particular relevance in this regard. Thus, the intentional unfreezing of the Kurdish conflict, aimed at weakening the legal Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and thereby gaining more votes in favor of the AKP in the upcoming snap elections, have a devastating impact on Turkey's relations with the Syrian Kurds, who in turn already have little trust in Ankara.
Finally, it is clear that during the recent intensification of the political dialogue between the major foreign players, the political leadership of Turkey shows no desire to engage in any dialogue with Damascus and thereby recognize it as the official partner. Such intransigence is also manifested in the Turkish action towards the “Islamic state”: despite loud assurances to begin an active struggle against the organization, Ankara is forced not to intervene because of its internal political problems. In effect, Turkey is considered an unreliable interlocutor by the Syrian Kurds, one of the major Syrian opposition groups.
All this demonstrates that the actions of an uncompromising Turkish leadership, confined by ideologies and set apart from reality, not only threaten to diminish its national security, but also harm its own national interests. And this, in turn, obstructs the possibility of a resolution of the Syrian crisis.
